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Several studies have recommended reliance on subordinated debt as a tool for monitoring 
banks by investors and for enhancing depositors’ protection. However, subordinated 
debenture increases the level of leverage and thus the probability of costly failure. We 
propose a novel financial instrument, ‘Debt-for-Equity Swap’ contract (DES), that pays 
to its holder a fixed income unless the value of the bank’s assets falls below a 
predetermined threshold. In such an event, the debt obligation is automatically converted 
to the bank’s common equities. By using a contingent claims valuation approach we 
present closed-form solutions for the valuation of liabilities, the cost of deposit insurance 
and the value of bankruptcy costs of a bank that includes DES or alternatively 
subordinated debt in its capital structure. We compare and evaluate quantitatively the 
effects of DES contract versus subordinated debt on bank stability, depositor protection, 
incentives for risk taking, the ability to provide market discipline and the value of 
bankruptcy costs. 
The implications of the paper highlight the fact that the DES contract has salient 
advantages over subordinated debt as an efficient tool for enhancing market stability and 
bank efficiency, since it reduces the value of bankruptcy costs. The advantage of the DES 
over subordinated debt as a provider of depositors’ protection depends on the level of 
mandatory intervention, assets value and volatility as well as on the ratio of bankruptcy 
costs. The model illustrates the pros and cons of each of the two capital instruments as a 
tool for enhancing market discipline. While the value of subordinated debt increases with 
the value of assets, its disadvantage as a monitoring tool derives from its low sensitivity 
to changes in assets volatility when the level of regulatory intervention is relatively high 
in terms of capital adequacy and the rate of bankruptcy costs is relatively low. The DES 
contract is beneficial as a tool for monitoring due to its negative sensitivity to increase in 
assets risk. However, when the conversion ratio is relatively high its price might increase 
as the leverage ratio increases. 
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Introduction 
 
Unlike firms in non-financial, unregulated industries, the primary creditors in a bank, the 
depositors, do not have sufficient incentives to monitor the bank, because of the implicit 
or explicit guarantees that are provided to commercial banks by national governments. As 
a result, governments, as the depositors’ insurers, have a strong incentive to monitor 
banks in order to avoid insolvency. Moreover, the motivation of governments stemmed 
from the fact that bank insolvency may spillover to other sectors of the financial system 
and, through it, to the real economy (See Allen and Herring (2001) and Flannery (2002)). 
Over the past decades, as the size and complexity of financial firms have 
enormously increased, government supervisors have found it more difficult and 
challenging to monitor and control banks in a timely manner by using traditional 
supervisory techniques such as minimum capital requirements and regular review of a 
bank’s risk management procedures. Accordingly, considerable efforts have been made 
by banks and their supervisors to include capital instruments  that enhance market 
discipline.1  
Recent studies have recommended subordinated notes and debentures (hereafter 
SND) as a preferred tool to discipline banks and policymakers are actively considering 
requiring banks to issue SND.
2  It is argued that  the expected negative effect on 
subordinated debt prices to excessive risk-taking encourage their holders to monitor the 
bank closely on an on-going basis, in a way which is aligned with those of the deposits' 
insurers.  Moreover, it is asserted that the SND can impose discipline indirectly by 
providing risk signals to other market participants and regulators who can then discipline 
the bank (See Evanoff and Wall (2001)).    3 
While helping to monitor a bank’s activities and  increasing the size of the 
financial cushion for the deposit insurer, the subordinated debenture also  increases its 
leverage and the probability of default by the issuing financial institution. According to 
the classical structural approach, in the event of firm failure equity investors simply 
surrender the firm to the bond investors who proceed to operate the firm in the most 
efficient manner available.
3 In reality, the costs of distress and bankruptcy are substantial, 
especially in the banking industry, in which a weak credit rating limits a bank's ability to 
trade foreign exchange and OTC derivatives and to extend lines of credit to borrowing 
customers.  
To overcome the disadvantages of the SND mechanism, Flannery (2002) presents 
qualitatively a potential new capital instrument: ‘Reverse Convertible  Debentures’ 
(RCD), which is converted into common stocks if the issuing firm's capital ratio falls 
below some pre-specified level. The RCD conversion is triggered automatically: neither 
the issuer nor the investor  will have an option regarding this conversion and the 
debentures convert at the current share price. When the firm’s share price is depressed, 
part of the outstanding debt is forgiven and thus the incidence of costly failures is 
reduced.  
Relying on the market price of the liabilities as the trigger for conversion may 
lead to price puzzling, since it is unclear under which conditions conversion would take 
place. The market price of each corporate liability is a function of the ex-post possible 
payoffs that are contingent on the value of the underlying asset of the corporation. 
However, by determining that the payoff of a claim could be replaced by another payoff 
at some future time, if its value ex-ante (market value) has touched some predetermined 
level, may lead to an undesired equilibrium in which conversion may not occur even if 
the corporation is in a bad standing and vice versa.     4 
 In this paper we elaborate the conversion mechanism by suggesting a capital 
instrument: Debt-for-Equity-Swap contract (hereafter DES), which has a fixed payoff 
upon  maturity, unless the value of assets falls below some pre-specified conversion 
threshold at any time until debt’s maturity. In such event, the debt contract is converted 
automatically according to a predetermined conversion ratio into the bank’s common 
stocks. Under the presented mechanism, when the value of the bank’s assets is depressed, 
the outstanding amount of the DES is forgiven and thus the incidence of costly failures is 
reduced.  
For the evaluation and quantitative comparison of the effects of issuing DES 
contract versus subordinated debt, we adopt a contingent claim framework, à la  Black 
and Cox (1976, hereafter BC) and Ericsson and Reneby (1998), where each of the bank’s 
liabilities, under each of the two capital structures, is mimicked by a portfolio of barrier 
options.  By using this modular approach we derive closed-form solutions for the 
liabilities of a bank, the cost of deposit insurance and the value of bankruptcy costs. 
Relying on the derived closed-form solutions, we compare the effects of the DES 
and SND contracts on several crucial policy targets as bank stability, depositor 
protection, minimizing the value of bankruptcy costs and enhancement of market 
discipline. We analyze how the levels of volatility, leverage ratio, bankruptcy costs and 
the mandatory supervisory intervention affect these goals. 
The valuation of a bank's liabilities requires setting a trigger point for mandatory 
supervisory intervention. Previous models for pricing SND contracts (See  Levonian 
(2001) and Nivorozhkin (2001)) assume based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model that 
default can occur only at debt maturity if the value of assets falls below the debt's face 
value. We, like BC, assume that bank failure can occur at the first time when the value of 
assets falls below a predetermined threshold. In such event, the remaining assets of the   5 
bank are distributed among the claimholders according to their seniority. However, in our 
model, conversely to BC, liquidation may be costly. Moreover, the trigger point in our 
model is  based on the assumption that  the solvency of a bank is determined by its 
regulator according to a minimum “adequate” capital level, which is expressed as a 
percentage of the book value of equity. Thus, a mandatory supervisory intervention 
occurs usually when the value of assets is well above the bank’s outstanding debt. Aware 
of this fact, the liquidation threshold in our model is set at least equal to the value of the 
bank’s outstanding debt.
4  
We prove that the difference between the default probabilities of a bank with 
SND and a bank with DES contract, holding everything else constant, is always positive. 
The power of DES as provider of depositors’ protection is more questionable. We prove 
that the ratio between the cost of insurance of a deposit in a bank that includes DES 
contract in its capital structure, and a similar insurance of a deposit in a bank which 
includes instead SND may be lower, equal or larger than one. We show that the ratio 
between the costs of insurance of a deposit in a bank with SND contract and an identical 
deposit in a bank with DES contract is a decreasing function of assets volatility, leverage 
ratio and the level of mandatory supervisory intervention, which is expressed as the ratio 
between the value of assets and the total face value of debts. We demonstrate that for a 
relatively low ratio of bankruptcy costs, the cost of deposit insurance is lower for a bank 
with SND contract, while the conversely occurs when bankruptcy costs are relatively 
high. However, as the level of supervisory intervention increases (in the form of 
relatively high liquidation threshold) the costs of deposits insurance are equalized at a 
higher ratio of bankruptcy costs.  
It is argued that the SND contract can impose direct discipline on banks by 
charging high funding costs once excessive risk-taking activities are detected. The results   6 
of empirical studies that examine whether risky debt, issued by banks and bank holding 
companies, facilitates market monitoring and the control of risk taking have been mixed. 
Using our theoretical framework, we demonstrate that unlike the DES contract, the SND 
contract could be almost insensitive to changes in assets’ volatility if the bank is highly 
regulated and the rate of bankruptcy costs is relatively low. We find that the effect of the 
regulatory intervention policy on the sensitivity of the SND's price to increase in assets 
volatility is not obvious, and depends on the leverage ratio. It is shown that while the 
sensitivity of the SND to changes in asset price is always positive, the sensitivity of the 
DES contract could be negative under relatively high conversion ratio, and its efficiency 
as a tool for market monitoring is therefore questionable. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that the interests of b ondholders and 
shareholders in a leverage firm strongly diverge regarding the risk that can accompany 
higher firm profits, since the increase in assets volatility results in a transfer of value from 
the debtholders of a firm to its equityholders. However, as demonstrated by Reisz and 
Perlich (2004), if the liquidation threshold is higher than the sum of the total liability, the 
probability of going bankrupt becomes too large and shareholders will shy away from 
any risky project. In this case we might observe a risk-avoidance problem à la John and 
Brito (2000).  In consistency with this approach, Flannery (2002) asserts that the 
introduction of subordinated debt into a bank’s capital structure increases the level of 
leverage and thus  exacerbates the problem of risk-avoidance and might even hurt the 
competitive nature of a bank and its task as liquidity provider. He suggests that the 
inclusion of “Reverse convertible debentures” (RCD) instead of subordinated debt, can 
forestall financial distress without distorting the stockholders risk-taking incentives. In 
this paper, it is shown that the inclusion of DES contract in a bank’s capital structure may 
not avoid the distortion of the shareholders’ risk taking incentive. This effect depends   7 
among other factors on the level of the conversion threshold and on the conversion ratio. 
Moreover, the shareholders’ risk-taking incentive in a bank with DES contract may be 
lower than the incentive of shareholders in bank that is identical in all other respects 
except for replacing the DES contract with contract that does not include the conversion 
feature (i.e.: SND contract). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
assumptions for the valuation of corporate liabilities of a bank with DES contract in its 
capital structure.  Section 3 analyzes in a similar manner a bank with SND contract in its 
capital structure. Section 4 shows the valuation of a bank’s claims under each of the two 
capital structures via options replication. Section 5 compares quantitatively the effects of 
DES contract versus SND on bank’s stability, depositor protection, the enhancement of 
market discipline and the value of bankruptcy costs. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are 
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2. Capital structure with DES contract 
 
In this section we discuss the basic economic setting on which we base our model for 
pricing corporate liabilities of a bank with capital structure that consists of senior deposit, 
DES contract and equity. We show the valuation of these liabilities, and derive closed 
form solutions for the values of bankruptcy costs and for the cost of deposit insurance 
under the presented capital structure.  
 
2.1 Setup and Key Assumptions 
Consider a hypothetical bank with assets w that are continuously traded in an arbitrage-
free and complete market with riskless borrowing or lending at a constant rate of  r . The 
value of the bank’s assets is independent of its capital structure, and is well described 
under the risk neutral probability by the following stochastic differential equation: 
 
            dW dt r d sw w d w + - = ) (                                              (1) 
 
where Wis a standard Brownian motion, d is the institution’s payout ratio and s is the 
instantaneous constant standard deviation of the rate of return of the bank.
5 
To finance its assets, the bank issues three types of claims: a single zero-coupon 
deposit, a single DES contract and a residual equity claim with market v alue denoted by 
S . The zero-coupon deposit matures at time  T , has principal value of 
B F and market 
value of  B. The depositor is the most senior security holder, and thus has priority over all 
classes of securities in a way that will be specified later on. It is assumed that the 
government, which supervises the bank through a specialized regulator, would  force   9 
liquidation or reorganization at any time T] [0,   ˛ t if the value of assets has reaches an 
exogenous lower threshold
l K , where this threshold is defined as: 
 
                                       




.                         (2) 
 
In contrast to the convention in most structural models in our model, the threshold 
level is at least equal to the face value of debt. Previous models assume, based on the 
nature of existing safety covenants or common practice and law, that the debtholders or 
regulators have the power to enforce liquidation or reorganization only if the value of 
assets has reached the debt’s principal value.
6 However, regulators usually determine the 
solvency of a bank according to a minimum “adequate” capital level, which is expressed 
as a percentage of the book value of equity, and thus the reorganization of a bank occurs 
well above the bank’s debt face value. The time of default, where liquidation is declared, 
is denoted by  l t  and is defined formally by: 
 
          { }
l
t l K t £ > = w t      0   inf                                                       (3) 
 
If default has occurred, so  l T t ‡ , a fraction  1 0 £ £g of value will be lost due to 
bankruptcy costs.
7  The costs of bankruptcy consist of, for example, losses due to 
suspended deliveries by cautious suppliers  or the ex-post costs of over or under-
investment incentives. In the banking industry, bankruptcy costs could also include the 
cutting down of trades in financial derivative, where counterparties aware of the bank’s   10 
condition would reduce derivative transactions in which they might have credit exposure 
to the distressed bank.  
Similar to the deposit, the DES contract matures at time T and has a principal 
value of 
D F   and market value of  D . The DES is  converted automatically into 
a ) 1 0 ( £ £a  common stocks if the value of assets falls below some pre-specified 
conversion threshold, denoted by  c K , at any time prior  to debt’s maturity. While the 
level of the liquidation threshold is determined exogenously by the behavior of the 
regulator, the conversion threshold is set in the contract terms. Since the main goal of the 
DES  issue is to reduce the incidence of costly  failures, a natural choice is to set the 
conversion threshold, like the liquidation threshold, at a level which is at least equal to 
the sum of the principal value of the deposit and the DES, and thus  ) (
D B c F F K + ‡ . 
This threshold level ensures that the event of bank insolvency may not occur before the 
time of an enforced conversion, and thus the DES holder has no legal support to force 
early liquidation. However, the regulator may have incentive to liquidate the bank before 
the event of conversion i f the DES principal amount is  limited and the conversion 
threshold is relatively close to the level of the deposit face value. To ensure the efficiency 
of the conversion mechanism, the threshold level should be set at a sufficient level above 
the total sum of all claims’ face value. The time of conversion is denoted by  c t  and is 
defined formally by: 
 
           { } c
t c K t £ > = w t      0   inf                                                      (4) 
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2.2. Valuation of the Bank liabilities with DES contract 
The market value of the bank,V , is equal to the sum of the value of its securities, i.e.: 
D B S Vt + + = . In the presence of bankruptcy costs and the deductibility of tax and 
interest payments, this value is not in general equal to the value of assets, w .
8 We assume 
neither tax nor interest deductibility, since we want to concentrate on the effects of the 
DES contract on the value of the bank’s liabilities and on the value of bankruptcy costs. 
Under this assumption, the value of assets are at least equal to the bank’s market value, 
such that V ‡ w .  
As presented by BC and similarly by Ericsson and Reneby (1998), the value of 
zero-coupon corporate security can be decomposed into two sources of value: first, its 
value at maturity, assuming the bank is not prematurely liquidated, and second, its value 
if the bank is liquidated before debt maturity, T .
9 Although these two components are 
mutually exclusive, they are both possible outcomes and accordingly each contributes to 
the present value of both equity and debt. Since the issuing of the DES contract involves 
the introduction of a conversion threshold, which is efficiently located above the 
liquidation threshold and below the value of the bank’s assets, the values of the stock and 
the DES should be decomposed to three mutual exclusive sources of value, and can be 
expressed as:  
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where 
Q E  denotes the conditional expectation under a risk neutral measure Q given all 
available information at time zero, and  y 1 is the indicator function of the event y . The 
symbols 
S F  and 
D F  are the payoff functions upon liquidation of the stock and the DES 
contract respectively, which depend on the ratio of bankruptcy costs, and can be 
expressed as: 
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The first term on the right hand side of each of equations (5) and (6) accounts for the cash 
flows that are generated if the value of assets has not touched the conversion threshold 
until maturity( ) T c > t , as depicted in Figure 1.A. In such cases, the debtholder is fully 
paid and the equityholder receives the residual amount. The second term on the right 
hand side of each equation accounts for the cash flows that are generated if conversion 
has occurred but no liquidation process has happened until debt maturity, i.e.  c l T t t ‡ > , 
as depicted in Figure 1.B. The stockholder would deliver a portion of a common stock to 
the DES holder, while the DES holder would waive the debt obligation. The payoff to the 
DES holder at maturity in this state is equal to  a  units of the difference between the 
value of assets and the deposit face value, 
B F . The initial stockholder would receive   13 
) 1 ( a - units of the same payoff. Upon liquidation, where  l T t ‡ , as depicted in Figure 
1.C, the bank incurs costs that represent a portion  g   of the value of its assets. If  the 
proceeding assets are distributed according to absolute priority, then the depositor, as the 
most senior security holder, would receive the minimum between the debt face value and 
the remaining assets
l K ) 1 ( g - . In the extreme case, when the senior depositor has been 
fully paid off, the initial equityholder and the DES holder would receive the residual as 
expressed through equations (7) and (8) respectively. 
The current value of the senior deposit, provided neither conversion nor 
liquidation have occurred until the current time, is expressed by:  
:  
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where 
B F  is the payoff function upon liquidation, which depends on the ratio of 
bankruptcy costs, and can be written as: 
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The current value of bankruptcy costs, denoted byBC , reflects the market value 
of a payoff of 
l K g  should liquidation occur. The value of the bank, V , is equal to the 
value of assets minus the value of bankruptcy costs. Therefore, we can write its current 
value as:   14 
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The payoffs to the claimholders for various realized asset values and the alternative ratio 
of bankruptcy cost are summarized in Table 1. 
 
2.3  The Introduction of Deposit Insurance in the  Presence of DES 
Contract. 
Two of the primary objectives of the regulator, who supervises the banking system, are to 
attain financial stability by avoiding systematic risk and to protect investors by ensuring 
that the financial services firm will be able to honor its liabilities to its depositors.  While 
the two measures capital adequacy and deposit insurance serve these two objectives, by 
imposing minimum capital adequacy the regulator tries to prevent ex-ante bank’s run, 
where by introducing explicit or implicit deposit insurance an ex-post measure, which 
compensates the depositor upon default, is employed. 
10  
In our model, the deposit insurance is assumed to absorb all risk for the senior 
debt and none for the DES contract and thus the deposit is fully insured or guaranteed.
11 
In that case, the liability of the provider of the deposit insurance (the guarantor’s liability) 
can be expressed as:  
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For a bank of given size, this liability is affected by four factors: the degree of deposit 
leverage which is reflected in the relationship between wand 
B F ; the rate of bankruptcy 
costs, the riskiness of the bank’s assets, which is reflected in the bank’s choice of assets’ 
volatility and the regulator mandatory intervention policy, which is reflected in the 
distance between the liquidation threshold and the deposit’s principal amount. The higher 
the spread between the liquidation threshold and the deposit's principal amount the 
smaller  is  the loss of the depositor upon liquidation. Securing the face value of the 
deposit at any possible state can be achieved by both measures, via deposit insurance 
and/or by setting a relatively high level of minimum capital adequacy in the form of  a 
relatively high liquidation threshold that causes the equity holder to carry all the burden 
of bankruptcy costs.  
According to Equation (12), deposit insurance and minimum capital adequacy are 
substitutive measures for eliminating the potential losses of the depositor upon 
liquidation. The regulator can increase the liquidation threshold, 
l K , in a way which 
nullifies the payoff of the insurer upon liquidation. However, in our model, conversely to 
the minimum capital adequacy measure, the presence of deposit insurance has no 
influence on the bank's default probability.12  
 
 
3. Capital structure with Subordinated Notes  
 
In this section we present a model for valuation of bank liabilities with traditional capital 
structure that includes senior debt, SND contract and equity. We present the added 
assumptions to those presented in Section 2.1 and then derive valuation equations for   16 
each of the bank’s securities under each possible state. In a similar manner, the cost of 
deposit insurance and the value of bankruptcy costs are derived. 
Since we assume that the value of bank’s assets is independent of its capital 
structure all the assumptions about the economy that were presented in Section 2.1 are 
hold ing. As in the previous presented capital structure, the bank is financed with equity 
and a single zero-coupon deposit with principal amount of 
B F
* and market value of 
* B . 
However, instead of issuing a DES contract, the bank has issued a single zero-coupon 
subordinated debt that matures at time  T , has a principal value of 
J F and a market value 
of  J . 
As in Section 2.1, the regulator policy is to force liquidation or reorganization if 
the value of assets falls below an exogenous threshold: 
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* * * J B l l
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where the liquidation threshold is denoted by 
l
K
* and the star superscript denotes a 
liquidation threshold of a bank with capital structure that includes SND. The liquidation 
threshold is at least equal to the sum of the principal values of the senior deposit and the 
SND. The time of default, where liquidation is declared, is denoted by  *
l t  and is defined 
formally by: 
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If liquidation has not occurred until debt’s maturity( ) T l >
* t , the debtholders 
would receive its debt’s face value, while the stockholder would receive the residual 
assets (See Figure 2.A). Upon liquidation, the residual assets of the bank, after 
bankruptcy costs have been incurred, would be distributed among the claimholders 
according to their seniority. The value of equity, provided that liquidation has not 
occurred by the current time can be expressed as:  
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t S  is the value of a stock issued by a bank with capital structure that includes 
SND, and 
S * F  is  the stock’s payoff function upon liquidation, which depends on the 
ratio of bankruptcy costs and can be written as: 
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If the remaining assets after bankruptcy costs are not sufficient to completely pay off the 
deposit then the SND’s holder receives nothing. Elsewhere, the holder of the SND 
receives the minimum between its debt’s face value and the remaining assets. The SND 
can be valued as: 
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where the function 
J F is the SND’s payoff function upon liquidation, which equals: 
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The value of the deposit can be written as: 
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where
B * F  is the deposit’s payoff function in the event of liquidation, which is equal to:  
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.  
The value of a bank with capital structure that includes SND, denoted by 
* V , is 
equal to the value of assets minus the value of bankruptcy costs, denoted by 
* BC . 
Therefore we can write the bank value as: 
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The need for deposit insurance under the presumed capital structure arises only in 
states in which the size of bankruptcy costs is larger than the difference between the level 
of the liquidation threshold and the deposit’s face value. The cost of a deposit insurance 
that fully compensates the depositor upon liquidation is denoted by 
* G and expressed by:  
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The payoffs to the claimholders for various realized asset values and the alternative ratio 
of bankruptcy cost are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
4.  Pricing the Bank’s Claims by Replicating Payoffs 
 
The following valuation method utilizes the fact that each of the bank’s securities can be 
expressed as a combination of four building blocks: down-and-out call and down-and-in 
call options, down-and-out and down-and-in  Heaviside call options. Assuming no 
arbitrage, claims with identical payoff function must have equivalent value. Hence, in 
order to price the different liabilities we simply need to mimic each security by using 
combinations of these four basic claims. In this section we define the payoff function and 
the value of each option that serves as one of the building blocks for pricing the bank’s 
liabilities, and then we show how to replicate the bank’s different claims under each of 
the two capital structures.    20 
 
4.1 Definitions of the Basic Claims 
 
Definition 1: If the value of assets has (has not) hit a lower barrier  K  until maturity then 
the holder of a down-and-in (out) call option receives at maturity,T , the maximum 
between zero and the difference between the value of assets, T w  and an exercise price of 
F . 
Lemma 1: The price of a down-and-in call option and down-and-out call option (with 
payoff given by definition 1) is: 
[ ] } { 1 ) ( ) , , ( T T
Q rT di F E e K F T C <
+ - - = t w  
[ ] } { 1 ) ( ) , , ( T T
Q rT do F E e K F T C ‡
+ - - = t w  
 
where  ) , , ( K F T C
di and  ) , , ( K F T C
do  are the current values of down-and-in call and 
down-and-out call, with expiry at time  T . The strike price of the options is equal to F  
and the barrier is equal to K . The superscript ‘di’ indicates a down-and-in type contract 
and the superscript ‘do’indicates a down-and-out type contract.t is the first time that the 
value of assets has touched the lower barrier K . 
 
Definition 2: If the value of assets has hit a lower barrier  K  until maturity, T , the 
holder of a down-and-in Heaviside call (at hit) would receive a unit of 1$ at the hitting 
time t . 
Lemma 2: The price of a down-and-in Heaviside call (with payoff given by definition 2) 
is: 




r Q di e E K T H    21 
 
where  ) , ( K T H
di is the current value of a down-and-in Heaviside call with expiry at time 
T and a barrier level of  K .  
 
Definition 3: If the value of assets has not hit a lower barrier  K  until maturity, T , the 
holder of a down-and-out Heaviside call would receive a unit of 1$ at maturity. 
Lemma 3: The price of a down-and-out Heaviside call (with payoff given by definition 3) 
is: 




rT do E e K T H  
 
where  ) , ( K T H
do is the value of a down-and-out Heaviside call with expiry at time  T and  
barrier level  K . The reader will find in Appendix-A a reminder of the pricing formulas 
for all four basic barrier options that are needed. 
 
4.2 Replicating Corporate Securities that Include DES Contract 
The following options portfolios mimic the payoffs of the stock and the DES 
contract respectively: 
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The long down-and-out call position represents the stock payoff if neither liquidation nor 
conversion have occurred. In this state, the holder of the DES contract has 
D F  units of 
down-and-out Heaviside call option. The long down-and-in call position account for the 
combined effects that occur upon reaching the conversion threshold: the dilution of the 
initial stockholder and the reduction of the level of debt to
B F .  
To account for early liquidation and for the transfer of control to the senior 
depositor, a short down-and-in call position is introduced. This option, with barrier
l K , 
offset exactly upon liquidation the long down-and-in payoff with barrier level 
c K , 
leaving the stockholder with zero payoffs. In the extreme case, in which the senior 
depositor has been fully paid, and thus 0 ) 1 ( > - -
S l F K g , the initial equityholder and the 
DES holder would receive the residual assets.  
The senior deposit is not influenced in any case by the conversion activity and 
thus its payoff should be mimicked only by options with barrier level that equal to the 
liquidation threshold: 
 
                   ) , ( ) , (
l di B l do B K T H K T H F B F + =                                     (25) 
 
  The current value of bankruptcy costs is equal to its magnitude times the present 
value of 1$ conditional on future default. Thus its value is isomorphic to down-and-in 
Heaviside call option with payoff of 
l K g . The value of a bank, V , reflects its assets value 
minus the value of bankruptcy costs and can be expressed as:  
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The cost of deposit insurance can be expressed as a down-and-out Heaviside call 
option, with payoff upon liquidation which  is equal to the difference between the face 
value of the deposit and the remaining assets of the bank: 
 
                                              [ ]         ) , ( ) 1 (
l di l B K T H K F G g - - =                                 (27) 
 
4.3 Replicating Corporate Securities that Include SND                                                       
The value of each of the bank liabilities is identical to the value of a portfolio that 
consists of two types of options. The first are down-and-out options that mimic the payoff 
if early liquidation has not occurred, and the second are down-and-in options that mimic 
the payoff in the event of liquidation. The values of the stock, the SND contract and the 
senior deposit can be mimicked by the following options: 
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As for a bank with capital structure that includes DES contract, the value of the bank, 
* V , is equal to the value of its assets minus a down-and-in Heaviside call option with 
payoff equal to the size of bankruptcy costs: 
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where 
* BC  is the current value of bankruptcy costs of a bank that includes SND in its 
capital structure. The cost of deposit insurance, denoted by 
* G , can be mimicked by a 
down-and-out call option with liquidation threshold 
l K
* , which can be expressed as: 
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5. Debt-for-Equity Swap Contract versus Subordinated Notes 
 
Equipped with closed form solutions for the valuation of a bank’s liabilities, which 
includes a DES or alternatively an SND contract as part of its capital structure, we can 
compare these two capital structures with respect to the fundamental tasks of preventing 
costly failures in banking, reducing the cost of deposits insurance, enhancing market 
discipline and reducing the current value of bankruptcy costs.  
The effects of each contract on promoting the presented goals are compared in the 
following sections.  As a base case for our analysis, we assume a bank with capital 
structure that is composed of a single zero-coupon deposit with  95 =
B F , a single DES 
contract with  5 =
D F , and a stock.  Both liabilities mature in one year. The value of the 
bank’s assets equals 130, the risk free interest rate is  % 3 = r , the volatility of the bank's 
assets is equal to 12% and no payout is expected ) 0 ( = d . Bankruptcy costs, as percentage 
of the value of the bank’s assets upon liquidation, are equal to 20% and the parameter 
c l is equal to 1.05, which means that conversion would occur if the value of assets is   25 
equal to 105% of the total sum of the principal amounts (deposit plus DES). At the first 
time that the value of assets reaches the conversion threshold, the DES holder would 
receive automatically 0.25 of common stock issued by the bank in exchange for waiving 
the debt contractual obligation. The liquidation threshold is equal to 96.9 and therefore 
liquidation occurs when the value of assets is equal to 102% of the total outstanding debt, 
which consists by that time only of the senior deposit.  
The compared bank  is identical  in all respects except for  its having an SND 
instead of DES contract.  The SND contract has identical terms as the DES contract 
except conversion. We assume that the regulator has a consistent mandatory intervention 
policy in the form of  a liquidation threshold  that equal to a constant 
parameter ) (
* l l l l = multiplied by  the  total debt’s principal amount. As a result, the 
liquidation threshold of a bank with SND in its capital structure,
l K
* , equals 102 in our 
example. Table 3 summarizes the input for the base case. 
 
5.1 Reducing the Incidence of Costly failures. 
 In this section we compare the risk neutral probability of default of the two capital 
structures and derive analytic expression for the difference between the two probabilities. 
The risk neutral probability that the value of assets would touch a lower threshold until 
debt maturity is equivalent to the probability that the running minimum of the log-asset 
value at maturity,  T , would be below the adjusted default threshold  ) ln( w K . As 
presented in Giesecke (2003), employing the fact that the distribution of the minimum is 
inverse Gaussian and setting 2 ) (
2 s d - - = r m , we can write this probability as: 
   26 
( )
































where  N is the standard normal distribution function.  
 
Lemma 4: If the mandatory supervisory intervention policy is set as a constant fraction 
of the total debt’s principal amount for all banks, then the difference between the risk 
neutral default probabilities of a bank with SND contract in its capital structure and a 
bank with DES contract, which are identical in all other respects, can be calculated as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )







































B l F m B l



















                                





) ( ln 2
*
                                                                                                                                         (33) 
 
It is noteworthy that the closed-form expression reported in Lemma 4 for the difference 
between the default probabilities is an increasing function of the following factors: 
volatility of assets, assets value, level of capital adequacy, which is measured in the form 
of the ratio between the liquidation threshold, and the total face value of debt. To 
illustrate, Table 4 presents the difference between the default probabilities for various 
levels of volatility, value of assets and liquidation threshold. When  , 130 = w   02 . 1
* l = =
l l l  
and 12%      = s  the difference is equal to 2.02%. However, when the value of assets changes 
to 120 or to 140, the difference is equal to 8.16% and 0.38% respectively. A decrease in 
the  level of the minimum capital adequacy, in the form of lower liquidation threshold, 
where  0 . 1
* l = =
l l l , decreases the difference between the default probabilities to 1.34%.   27 
However, a lower liquidation threshold could increase the cost of deposit insurance, as 
will be described at the following section. 
    
5.2 Depositors Protection: The Cost of Deposits Insurance 
While the DES contract  definitely enhances financial stability under any market 
conditions compared to the SND contract, its advantage as a measure for reducing the 
cost of deposits insurance and enhancing depositors’ protection is more ambiguous and 
depends on the ratio of bankruptcy costs, the value of assets (or the leverage ratio), the 
volatility of assets and the level of the liquidation threshold. 
 
Lemma 5: If the mandatory supervisory intervention policy is set as a constant fraction 
of the total debt’s principal amount for all banks, then the difference between the costs of 
deposit insurance of a bank with SND contract and a bank with DES contract, that are 
all else identical, can be positive, negative or equal to zero. 
§  Proof: See Appendix B.  
 
  Table 5 illustrates that the ratio between the cost of insurance of a deposit in a 
bank with SND in its capital structure and  the cost of insurance of a deposit in a bank 
with DES contract decreases with the level of liquidation threshold. When 
130 = w ,     0 . 1   
* l = =
l l l and  18% = s , the difference between the risk neutral 
probabilities of default is equal to 5.83% (See Table 4), and the ratio between the cost of 
deposits insurance is equal to 143.9%. However, when the liquidation threshold 
increases, such that 1 . 1  
* l = =
l l l , the difference between the risk neutral probabilities of 
default increases to 12.38% while the ratio between the costs of deposits insurance   28 
decreases to 98.8%, meaning that the cost of insurance of a deposit in a bank with DES 
contract becomes more expensive than an identical insurance of a deposit in a bank with 
SND contract in its capital structure. 
As the value of the bank’s assets decreases (the leverage is increased), issuing 
SND contract increases the probability of costly default and decreases the cost of deposit 
insurance compared to the DES contract. A decrease in the value of the bank’s assets to 
120 = w  increases the difference between the default probabilities from 5.83% to 11.18% 
while decreasing the ratio between the costs of deposit insurance from 143.9% to 
129.5%.  
  The behavior of the cost of deposit insurance with respect to the ratio of 
bankruptcy costs is shown in Figure 3. When the liquidation threshold is set at a 
relatively  low level, such that  0 . 1
* = =
l l l l , we find that the cost of insurance of a 
deposit in a bank with DES contract is higher than a deposit in a bank with SND contract 
until the ratios of bankruptcy costs are approximately equal to 7%. If the liquidation 
threshold is increased (in our example: 1 . 1
* = =
l l l l ), the costs of deposits insurance are 
equalized when the ratios of bankruptcy costs are approximately equal to 16%. 
Intuitively, we could think of it in the following way. Under a low ratio of bankruptcy 
costs the depositor in a bank with SND is fully paid in the event of liquidation if the level 
of liquidation threshold is relatively high, since the layers of equity and SND absorb all 
losses. The depositor in a bank with DES contract is not protected by an extra layer of 
debt, since the event of conversion would always precede the liquidation event and thus 
the depositor begins to suffer losses at a lower ratio of bankruptcy costs. When the ratio 
of bankruptcy costs increases both depositors would not be fully paid upon liquidation.   29 
However, the probability of a liquidation event is considerably higher for a bank with 
SND contract in its capital structure.  
 
5.3 Efficiency Enhancement: The Value of Bankruptcy Costs 
Although the deadweight value in the event of a bank failure is usually not limited to the 
collapsing bank, it is interesting to compare the value of bankruptcy costs of the two 
capital structures as a signal for efficiency.  
 
Lemma 2.6: If the mandatory supervisory intervention policy is set as a constant fraction 
of the total debt’s principal amount for all banks, then the difference between the values 
of bankruptcy costs of a bank with SND contract and a bank with DES contract, that are 
identical in all other respects l, is always positive. 
§  Proof: See Appendix 2.B 
 
When the value of assets is relatively high (low leverage ratio), the difference 
between the values of bankruptcy costs (as % of assets’ value) of a bank with SND in its 
capital structure and a bank with DES contract, that are identical in all other respects, 
increases with assets volatility (See Figure 4).  For a relatively  high level of assets 
volatility liquidation would certainly occur under each of the two capital structures, and 
thus the difference between the two values of bankruptcy costs would converge to 
( ) w g
l l K K -
* , which in the presented example equal  to 0.93%. Conversely, when the 
value of assets is relatively low (high leverage ratio), the difference between the values of 
bankruptcy costs is hump shaped with respect to assets’ volatility, and as the value of 
assets increases this difference is maximized at a higher level of assets volatility.    30 
5.4 Risk-Control and Market Monitoring 
In this section, we evaluate and compare the effects of the DES and the SND contracts on 
enhancing market monitoring and controlling the risk taking by the shareholders. A 
contract can enhance market monitoring due to its negative sensitivity to increased 
leverage or due to its negative sensitivity to an increase in assets’ volatility. The influence 
of a contract on the shareholders risk taking is measured by the sensitivity of the stock to 
changes in assets' volatility. 
 
a. Market Monitoring    
The presence of most subordinated debt instruments within a bank’s capital 
structure is justified by their protective nature and their ability to enhance market 
monitoring by charging high funding costs once excessive risk-taking activities are 
detected. Levonian (2001) presents a theoretical model for pricing SND, which is based 
on the Black-Scholes-Merton contingent claims analysis, and finds that an increase in the 
risk of assets will decrease the value of subordinated debt for solvent banks 
The results of empirical studies that examine whether risky debt issued by banks 
and bank holding companies enhances risk monitoring have been mixed. Studies done 
prior to 1992 failed to find a significant relationship between firm risk and yields on 
subordinated debt.
13 More recent studies do indicate that risk is being appropriately 
priced (See Flannery and Sorescu,1996, and Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux, 2002).
14 In 
a recent study, Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2003) examine whether changes in 
credit spreads reflect changes in firm specific risks. After controlling for changes in 
market-wide and liquidity factors, the authors do not find any consistent evidence for   31 
connection between the two. Moreover, the fact that banking firms are highly regulated 
could not explain the insensitivity of the subordinated debt spreads. 
In order to explore and to compare the sensitivity of the SND and the DES prices 
to changes in assets volatility, we present in figures 5 and 6 the vega of the two contracts 
against the ratio of bankruptcy costs for different levels of liquidation threshold and 
leverage.
15 When the ratio of liquidation costs is relatively low and banking firms are 
highly regulated, in the form of a relatively high liquidation threshold ) 06 . 1 (
* =
l l , the 
loss given default of the SND is zero. As a result, the SND price is insensitive to the level 
of volatility, and the SND contract is inefficient as a tool for providing market monitoring 
(See Figure 5). However, when the ratio of bankruptcy costs increases the SND holder 
would not be fully paid upon default, and therefore the contract price has negative vega. 
The effect of the mandatory regulatory intervention policy on the contract price is not 
obvious and depends heavily on the leverage ratio. When the leverage ratio is relatively 
low  [ ] 130 100 ) ( = + w
B J F F , the SND's vega decreases with the level of the liquidation 
threshold. Conversely, when the leverage is relatively high  ( ) 110 = w  the SND's vega 
increases with the level of the liquidation threshold. The vega of the DES contract 
receives negative values since a mandatory conversion would always precede the 
liquidation event (See Figure 6). 
The efficiency of the SND over the DES contract as a tool for providing market 
monitoring exists in regions in which the ratio of bankruptcy costs is relatively high. A 
relatively high ratio of bankruptcy costs decreases the recovery rate of both contracts 
upon liquidation, however, the potential compensation of the DES holder upon 
conversion, in the form of common stocks, reduces its vega compared to the SND.    32 
Figure 7 highlights the limitedness of the DES contract as a tool for providing 
market monitoring by plotting the value of the SND and the DES contract against the 
value of assets. While the value of the SND contract increases with assets value, the 
behavior of the DES contract depends on its conversion ratio (a). An increase in the 
value of assets produces two opposite effects: increasing the probability that the DES 
holder would be fully paid upon maturity and decreasing the probability of early 
mandatory conversion. As the conversion ratio increases (decreases) the later effect 
becomes more dominant (minor) and the value of the DES decreases (increases) with the 
value of assets.  
 
b. Risk-Avoidance or Risk-Transfer? 
In their seminal work, Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) offer the insight that 
equity value is identical to the price of a standard European call option on the total 
market value of the firm’s assets with an exercise price equal to the promised payment of 
corporate liabilities. However, as Galai and Masulis (1976) first pointed out, this option 
analogy suffers from the fact that the value of a standard call option is strictly increasing 
with assets’ volatility of the underlying assets. Hence, a shareholder-aligned manager, 
who is faced with a choice between two different projects “would invest in the project of 
higher variance. Moreover, it is even possible that a more profitable investment project 
will be rejected in favor of a project with a higher variance of percentage returns”, 
thereby transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders. This asset-substitution 
problem was much developed in the agency literature, starting with Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). According to this approach, the interests of bondholders and shareholders in a 
leverage firm strongly diverge regarding the risk that can accompany higher firm profits   33 
since the increase in assets volatility results in a transfer of value from the debtholders of 
a firm to its equityholders.  
The traditional methods employed by debtholders to deal with asset-substitution 
problems include increasing the required rate of return on their financial claims, design of 
safety covenants that limit a firm’s ability to shift risk, and simple termination of the 
relationships with the companies. Although the market is able to constrain the behavior of 
non-bank firms, commercial banks’ debtholders have weak incentives to protect the value 
of their claims due to the effects of implicit or explicit guarantees provided to commercial 
banks by national governments. However, by  setting a minimum level of mandatory 
intervention, government’s regulators have a strong impact on equityholders’ ability to 
transfer risk. As analyzed by Reisz and Perlich (2004), i f the liquidation threshold is higher 
than the sum of the total liability, the derivative of the stock price with respect to assets 
volatility (vega  of the option) is negative for all  s :  any risky investment makes the 
probability of going bankrupt too large and shareholders will shy away from any risky 
project. In this case, far from witnessing an asset substitution problem à la Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), we might observe a risk-avoidance problem à la John and Brito (2000): 
a shareholder-aligned manager, afraid of losing growth options privy only to her, can shy 
away from risk and undertake projects with suboptimal risk levels. Reisz and Perlich 
(2004) support this finding numerically and find that the value of equity decreases for 
low leverage ratio. 
 Consistent with this attitude, Flannery (2002) asserts that the introduction of 
subordinated debt into a bank’s capital structure increases the level of leverage and thus 
derives a higher liquidation threshold that exacerbates the problem of risk avoidance and 
might even hurt the competitive nature of bank and its task as liquidity provider.   34 
Moreover, it is suggested that the inclusion of “Reverse convertible debentures” (RCD), 
in a bank’s capital structure instead of subordinated debt can forestall financial distress 
without distorting the stockholders risk-taking incentives. In the present paper it is shown 
that the effect of including DES contract in a bank’s capital structure may not avoid the 
distortion of shareholders’ risk-taking incentive. This effect depends among other factors 
on the level of the conversion threshold and on the conversion ratio. Moreover, the 
shareholders’ risk-taking incentive in a bank with DES contract can be lower than the 
incentive of the shareholders in an identical bank except for replacing the DES contract 
with contract that does not include the conversion feature (i.e.: SND contract).  
To illustrate the effects of issuing SND versus DES contract on the stockholders’ 
motivation to increase assets’ volatility and to transfer risk, Figure 8 poses the value of 
the stock’s vega versus the value of the bank’s assets for different conversion threshold. 
In the extreme case, when the conversion ratio is equal to one (Figure 8.A), the 
stockholders lose all their shares when the value of the bank’s assets reach the conversion 
threshold. Therefore, the value of the stock is equal to the value of a stock in an identical 
bank with SND contract in its capital structure in which the liquidation threshold is equal 
to the conversion threshold of the DES contract. For this case the stock’s vega is always 
less or equal to zero and the risk-avoidance problem would not be forestalled. 
When the conversion ratio decreases to 0.75 (Figure 8.B), the vega of the stock 
begins to receive insignificant value from a lower assets’ value and thus the incentive for 
risk-avoidance is reduced. However, the DES contract superiority over SND as a mean 
for forestalling the risk-avoidance incentive depends on the difference between the 
contract’s conversion threshold and the level of the mandatory intervention policy of the 
regulator in a bank with SND in its capital structure. As the difference increases, the DES   35 
contract becomes less effective as a means for reducing the risk-avoidance incentive 
compared to the SND contract. 
When the conversion ratio further decreases to 0.25 (Figure 8.C), the vega of the 
stock can receive positive values for relatively low assets values. An increase in assets’ 
volatility increases the probability of reaching the conversion threshold which results in 
early forced conversion in exchange for unlevering the debt notional amount. As the 
conversion ratio decreases, the influence of the debt removal on the stock price becomes 
major and positive vega, which encouraged risk transfer by the equityholders, can be 
observed.   
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The increasing size and complexity of banking organizations and the desire to lower the 
potential vulnerability of the banking and the financial systems to systemic risk, have 
lead to a continuous effort to shape innovative financial tools that would assist in 
monitoring and controlling banks and supplement the traditional supervisory methods.  It 
is argued that subordinated debt can be a proper mechanism to enhance these tasks, since 
debtholders stand to suffer heavy losses in the event of insolvency and these losses 
motivate them to monitor the bank closely on an on-going basis. Yet, while removing 
part of the cost of deposits insurance from the insurer,  the subordinated debenture 
increases bank leverage and thus the probability of default by the issuing financial 
institution.   36 
In this paper we propose a novel financial instrument “Debt-for-Equity-Swap” 
contract (DES) that would automatically convert the debt obligation to a predetermined 
quantity of common equities if the value of assets falls below a predetermined threshold. 
Thus, when the assets of the bank perform poorly, the level of leverage is automatically 
reduced without involving the depositors, counterparties or supervisors.  
By using a modular option pricing approach, we present closed form solutions for 
the valuation of liabilities, the cost of deposits insurance and the value of bankruptcy 
costs of a bank that includes DES or alternatively subordinated debt in its capital 
structure. We compare and evaluate quantitatively the effects of DES contract versus 
subordinated debt on major policy issues as banks' stability, depositor protection, value of 
bankruptcy costs, market monitoring and control of risk taking.  
The policy implications of the paper highlight the fact that the DES contract has 
salient advantages over subordinated debt as an efficient tool for enhancing market 
stability and firm efficiency by reducing the value of bankruptcy costs. The power of the 
DES as a provider of depositors’ protection is more questionable. We find that the ratio 
between the cost of insurance of a deposit in a bank that includes DES contract in its 
capital structure, and a similar insurance of a deposit in a bank that includes SND instead 
may be lower equal or larger than one. While the difference between the default 
probabilities of SND and DES contract increases with the leverage ratio, assets' volatility 
and the level of the liquidation threshold, the ratio between the costs of the deposit 
insurance is a decreasing function of all the factors that were mentioned above.   
The efficiency of the DES contract on reducing the value of bankruptcy costs, in 
comparison with the SND contract, increases with the volatility of assets for relatively 
high leverage ratio. However, for relatively low leverage ratio the pattern is hump shaped 
and not strictly inclining.   37 
 
It is argued that including subordinated debt instruments within  a bank’s capital 
structure may enhance market discipline due to their negative sensitivity to changes in the 
level of volatility and leverage. However, the results of empirical studies have been 
mixed. We show the efficiency and the limitations of each of the two contracts as a tool 
for imposing market discipline. Conversely to the DES contract, the SND contract could 
be almost insensitive to changes in assets' volatility if the level of regulatory intervention, 
in terms of capital adequacy  is relatively high and the rate of bankruptcy costs is 
relatively low. We show that the effect of the regulatory intervention policy on the 
sensitivity of the SND's price is not obvious and depends on the leverage ratio. When the 
leverage ratio is relatively low (relatively high) the sensitivity of the SND's price 
decreases (increases) with the level of regulatory intervention. It is shown that while the 
sensitivity of the SND to changes in asset price is always positive, the sensitivity of the 
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Appendix A 
Below is a reminder of the pricing formulas of the four barrier options that serve as 
building blocks for the valuation of the bank's liabilities. For all the following options the 
barrier  H is strictly larger than the strike price  F and smaller than the starting value of 
assets  w, i.e.  F H ‡ ‡ w . The presented formulas were derived by Merton (1973) and 
Rubinstien and Reiner (1991). The reader who is familiar with the formulas can skip this 
appendix.  
The value of a down-and-in call and a down-and-out call at time zero is given 
respectively by: 
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The value of a down-and-in  Heaviside call (with payoff at touch) and a down-and-out 
Heaviside call (with payoff at maturity) is given respectively by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 7 5
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The insurance cost of a deposit in a bank with capital structure that includes DES contract 
and the cost of insurance of a deposit in a bank with SND contract, which is identical in 
all other respects, are given by equations (27) and (32) respectively: 
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Since we assume that the two banks are identical in all other respects and the liquidation 
policy is set as a constant fraction of the total debt’s principal amount for all banks, then 
we can write:
B B F F
* = , 
J D F F =  and 
l l * l l = . By  substituting equations (2) and (13) 
into equations (27) and (32) respectively and dividing one by another we receive:   40 
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The right side of Equation (2.A) can be decomposed into two separate expressions.  The 
first is always equal or greater than one, since by definition  1 0 £ £ g   and thus the 
expression  ) 1 ( g -
D F is always positive and as a result: 
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The second expression is the quotient of two down-and-in Heaviside call options (at hit). 
The option derivative with respect to the barrier level is: 
                         
T






ws w ws ws




5 + + + =
¶
¶












Since all the components of equation (2.C) are positive, the value of the option always 
increases with the level of the barrier, and consequently the following quotient is always 
smaller than one: 
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The values of bankruptcy costs of a bank with DES contract and of a bank with SND are 
given by equations (26) and (31) respectively: 
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Since we assume that the two banks are identical in all other respects and the mandatory 
intervention policy is set as a constant fraction of the total outstanding debt for all banks, 
we can write:
B B F F
* = , and 
l l * l l = . By  substituting  equations (2) and (13) into 
equations (26) and (31) respectively and dividing one by another we receive: 
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The right side of Equation (2.E) can be decomposed into two separates expressions.  The 
first is always equal or smaller than one since by definition 1 0 £ £ g : 
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The second expression is always smaller than one, since by setting all other parameters 
constant, the value of a down-and-in Heaviside call always increases with the level of the 
barrier (See Lemma 5), and thus we have: 
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Table 1: Claimholders’ Payoffs, in a bank with DES contract in its capital structure, 
for various realized asset values and ratio of bankruptcy costs 
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Table 3: Market and contract data for the base case: 
Bonds Maturity (T)  1 year  Conversion threshold  105 
Deposit’s principal amount (FB/F*B)  95  Liquidation threshold with DES  96.9 
DES/ SND principal amount (F
D/F
J)  5  Liquidation threshold with SND  102 
Ratio of bankruptcy costs (g)  0.20  Payout ratio (d)  0% 
Conversion ratio (a)  0.25  Risk free rate (r)  3% 
Assets’ volatility (s)  12%  The value of assets (w)  130 
 
 
Capital structure with:  DES  SND 
Stock price  33.06  32.88 
DES price (credit spread)  4.73  4.71 
Deposit price (credit spread)  92.05  91.93 
Value of bankruptcy costs  0.17  0.58 
Costs of deposit insurance  0.15  0.38 
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Table 4: The difference between the Default Probabilities of a bank with SND in its 
capital structure and a bank with DES contract for various levels of assets’ 





Parameters: See Table 3. 
 
 




as percentage of the 
total outstanding debt 
12.0%  18.0%  24.0% 
100.0%  6.01%  11.18%  11.70% 
102.0%  8.16%  12.75%  12.53% 
104.0%  10.75%  14.34%  13.31% 
106.0%  13.74%  15.91%  14.04% 




110.0%  20.69%  18.89%  15.28% 
100.0%  1.34%  5.83%  8.28% 
102.0%  2.02%  6.97%  9.11% 
104.0%  2.95%  8.22%  9.95% 
106.0%  4.17%  9.55%  10.77% 




110.0%  7.63%  12.38%  12.34% 
100.0%  0.23%  2.68%  5.45% 
102.0%  0.38%  3.36%  6.15% 
104.0%  0.61%  4.13%  6.88% 
106.0%  0.94%  5.01%  7.63% 




110.0%  2.08%  7.06%  9.17%   50 
Table 5: The ratio between the costs of insurance of a deposit in a bank with SND 
contract in its capital structure and a deposit in a bank with DES contract for 
various levels of assets’ volatility, value of assets and liquidation threshold (as 
percentage of the total outstanding debt). 
 
 
   
Assets’ volatility  Value of 
assets 
Liquidation threshold as 
percentage of the total 
outstanding debt  12.0%  18.0%  24.0% 
100.0%  214.5%  129.5%  107.3% 
102.0%  196.1%  122.6%  102.8% 
104.0%  178.4%  115.4%  97.8% 
106.0%  161.2%  107.7%  92.3% 




110.0%  126.1%  89.6%  78.3% 
100.0%  275.9%  143.9%  113.6% 
102.0%  251.5%  136.1%  108.7% 
104.0%  228.1%  127.9%  103.4% 
106.0%  205.3%  119.2%  97.5% 




110.0%  159.2%  98.8%  82.6% 
100.0%  351.4%  159.4%  120.0% 
102.0%  319.6%  150.6%  114.8% 
104.0%  289.3%  141.4%  109.1% 
106.0%  259.8%  131.6%  102.8% 




110.0%  200.5%  108.8%  87.0% 
 
Parameters: See Table 3. 
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                   (1.A)                                                                         (1.B) 
 
                                                      (1.C)         
Figure 1. 
The Time Line of the Model for the DES contract. 
There are three possible states in the model: (1.A) The bank is not liquidated until debt maturity ) ( T c > t , 
the debtholders are fully paid, while the stockholders receive the residual. (1.B) The value of the bank’s 
assets has reached the lower conversion threshold and as a result the DES holder receives a predetermined 
ratio of the bank’s stocks in exchange for unwinding its debt obligation ) ( c l T t t ‡ > . (1.C) The value of the 
bank’s assets has touched the liquidation threshold and liquidation (or reorganization) has occurred, 
bankruptcy costs of  ) 1 ( g -
l K are incurred. The firm is liquidated with all the proceeds being divided among 
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(2.A) No early liquidation 
(2.B) Early liquidation 
Figure 2. 
The Time Line of the Model for the SND contract. 
There are  two possible states  in the model: (2.A) since the  bank is not liquidated until debt 
maturity ) (
* T l > t , the debtholders are fully paid, while the stockholders receive the proceeds.  (2.B) 
Liquidation occurs prior to debt maturity  ) (
* T l £ t and in such event, bankruptcy costs of  ) 1 (
* g -
l K are 
incurred. The firm is liquidated with all the proceeds being divided among claimholders according to their 








































Deposit +SND Liquidation threshold
Deposit Assets' value
No Liquidation till 
debt's maturity  53 
Cost of Deposits Insurance vs. ratio of bankruptcy costs 
           1
* = =
l l l l  
              1 . 1
* = =
l l l l  
Figure 3 
The ratio of bankruptcy costs against the cost of deposit insurance as percentage of the deposit's face value 
for different levels of liquidation threshold 
Gray line: Bank with DES Contract in its capital structure. Black line: Bank with SND in its capital 





























































































The volatility level against the difference between the values of bankruptcy costs (as percentage of assets’ 
value) of a bank with SND in its capital structure and of a bank with DES contract in its capital structure 
that are all else identical, for different value of assets. All other parameters are identical to the base case as 
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SND’s vega versus the ratio of bankruptcy costs for different liquidation thresholds.  
Black line:  02 . 1
* =
l l . Gray line:  04 . 1
* =
l l . Dashed line:  06 . 1
* =
l l . Assets’ volatility is equal to 24%. All 
other parameters are identical to the base case (See Table 3). 
 
          

























































































DES’s vega versus the ratio of bankruptcy costs for different liquidation thresholds.  
Black line:  02 . 1 =
l l . Gray line:  04 . 1 =
l l . Dashed line:  06 . 1 =
l l . Assets’ volatility is equal to 24%. All 
other parameters are identical to the base case (See Table 3). 
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The values of SND and DES contracts versus the value of assets for different levels of liquidation and 
conversion thresholds.   
Black line:  02 . 1
* = =
l l l l . Gray line:  04 . 1
* = =
l l l l . Dashed line:  06 . 1
* = =
l l l l . Blue dashed line: risk-
free price. All other parameters are identical to the base case (See Table 2.3). 
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Stock’s vega of vs. assets’ value  
                      (8.A)    a = 1                                                            (8.B)          a=0.75 
       
(8.C)    a = 0.25    





Stock’s vega of a bank with DES contract in its capital structure versus assets’ value for different 
conversion thresholds and conversions ratio (a). Black line:  02 . 1 =
c l . Gray line:  04 . 1 =
c l . Dashed black 
line:  06 . 1 =
c l , Dashed black line: Stock’s vega of a bank with SND with  02 . 1
* =
l l . All other parameters 
are identical to the base case (See Table 3). 
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Endnotes 
                                                  
1 Market discipline has been explicitly recognized as one of the three pillars that allow 
banks and supervisors to evaluate properly the various risks that banks face. The 
additional two pillars are minimum capital requirements and regular review of a bank’s 
risk management procedures (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). 
2  For example, the U.S.A Federal Reserve task force (See Kwast et al. (2000)) has 
summarized 11 different forms for subordinated debt. Policymakers are actively 
considering requiring banks to issue SND. A mandatory SND requirement appears to be 
an important part of the market oriented reforms contained in the consultative paper 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999). The U.S Shadow 
Regulatory Committee (SFRC, 2000) has come out strongly in favor of mandatory SND 
as a mechanism for realizing enhanced market discipline of banks.  
3 See Merton (1974 and 1977) and Black and Cox (1976). 
4 As noted by Reisz and Perlich (2004), bank disclosure rules enforce liquidation when 
the capital of a bank falls below a threshold equal to 2% of assets.  
5 To keep the notation as simple as possible, all variables without subscripts are present 
values. 
6 In our model, liquidation may occur in or outside bankruptcy proceedings. We refer to 
liquidation and reorganization interchangeably.  
7 As presented in Leland (1994) we focus on bankruptcy costs that are proportional to 
asset value when bankruptcy is declared. Alternatives such as constant bankruptcy costs, 
as suggested by Ericsson and Reneby (1998), or mixed costs, as suggested by Acharya et 
al. (1994), are explored  readily  within the framework developed. Deviations from 
absolute priority rule, in which bondholders do not receive all remaining value, as 
showed by Franks and Torous (1989) and Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990), can 
also be incorporated in the model.  
8 In the literature,  V is often referred to as the value of the levered firm and  w  as the 
value of the unlevered firm. 
9 Black and Cox (1976) decompose firm value into two additional components. The first 
is the value of the bond in the event that the value of the firms’ assets has touched an 
upper boundary where reorganization is occurred. While we concentrate on the effects of   59 
                                                                                                                                                    
bankruptcy on the bank’s security, this upper threshold is not influential on the value of 
the bank’s claims. The second is the value of intermediate payments in solvency. 
However, since we are dealing with zero coupon securities this component does not exist.  
10 A summary of regulatory measures and regulatory objectives can be found in Allen and 
Herring (2001). 
11 A full coverage of loss by the insurer may generate a moral hazard problem, since the 
depositors’ incentive to monitor bank risk is likely to become nil under full insurance. 
Insurance pricing based on individual risk is used in many insurance markets to reduce 
this form of moral hazard. However, our model can easily accommodate deviation from 
the full coverage assumption. 
12 According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) deposit insurance also effect bank stability. 
Bank runs are self-fulfilling prophecies. If everyone believes that a banking panic is 
about to occur, it is optimal for each individual to try and withdraw her funds and since 
each bank has insufficient liquid assets to meet all of its commitments a systematic 
failing of banks would occur. However, in the presence of deposits insurance there are 
sufficient liquid assets to meet these genuine liquidity demands and there will be no 
panic.  
13 Examples include Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero 
(1990). A review of this literature can be found in Flannery (1998) and Bliss (2000). 
14 Other recent studies include De Young et al (2001), Morgan and Stiroh (2001) and 
Sironi (2002, 2003) 
15  Vega is defined as the rate of change in the price of a contract with volatility.  